Description of Event:
In July and September 2020, the company received formal correspondence from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Office of Energy Projects, Division of Dam Safety and Inspections’ Regional Office.
The first formal correspondence was dated July 20, 2020, and titled “Overdue Items for the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Projects, and Company’s Owners Dam Safety Program”. The July letter listed the specifics of fourteen overdue Dam Safety compliance items. Many items listed were significantly overdue, with due dates as far back as May 17, 2019. The letter stated, “Within 45 days of the date of this letter, please submit these overdue items or a plan and schedule to submit them.” The company failed to respond by September 3, 2020.
The second formal correspondence was dated September 16, 2020 and titled “Overdue Items for the Epsilon and Sigma Projects” from the same FERC office. The September letter enclosure listed the specifics of six Dam Safety compliance items (overdue since April 27, 2020 and May 21, 2020), all of which were different than those fourteen items identified in the July letter. This letter also stated, “Within 45 days of the date of this letter, please submit these overdue items or a plan and schedule to submit them.” The company failed to respond by October 31,2020.
Both the July and the September correspondence were processed as expected. The Hydro Licensing Compliance Analyst (CA), who works for the Supervisor of Hydro Licensing Compliance received correspondence from the regulator. The correspondence is attached to SAP HC tasks and distributed/assigned to the Dam Safety group.
The 7/20/2020 formal correspondence was preceded by unofficial email notices from FERC in May and June. The company’s License Coordinators (LC) and Dam Safety discussed the unofficial email notices and developed an action plan to address the items that were overdue and commit to new due dates; however, this action plan was not followed.
On November 24, 2020, the company received a third letter from the same FERC office. That letter stated, in part:
This letter is to inform The company about several items which our records indicate are currently overdue. The overdue items are listed in the enclosure.
In addition, as of the date of this letter, it does not appear that we have yet received a response to either our July 20, 2020 letter regarding overdue items for several projects, nor our September 16, 2020 letter regarding overdue items for two additional projects. The Company’s responses to both letters are now overdue.
In addition, the letter also requested:
Within 45 days of the date of this letter, please submit the overdue items listed in the enclosure or an updated plan and schedule to address the items. The company is reminded that submitting required dam safety-related items or extension of time requests to address the items in a timely manner is a matter of compliance with the project licenses.
This November letter then listed the specifics of 68 Dam Safety compliance items. Of those 68 items listed, ten were each noted as “…included in FERC’s 7/20/20 letter, and it remains outstanding,” and two were each noted as “…included in FERC’s 9/16/20 letter, and it remains outstanding.”
In addition to the process followed for the July and September letters, on November 25, 2020, the Chief Dam Safety Engineer initiated an internal review upon receipt of the November 24, 2020 letter to evaluate the letter’s contents as a potential self-report trigger under company policy.
On December 2, 2020, the CA wrote a new notification to track the November 24th letter response. A task was created to track the 45-day filing to FERC, with the Hydro Licensing Compliance Supervisor as assigned owner.
As of December 18, 2020, the CA had attached a copy of this letter to most of the existing notifications created to track the 68 subject overdue compliance items.
Actions Taken:
Respond to overdue letters
Method & Findings:
Barrier Analysis:
Resources: Inadequate resources to perform this work led to competing priorities and lack of attention to these letters. Unclear roles and responsibilities led to a lack of accountability.
Processes and Procedures: Failure of this barrier contributed to a lack of ownership and transparency.
Corrective Action Program: Because this barrier was not used, the transparency and prioritization available in the internal tracking system was not used.
Supervisory Tools: Measurement is an indication that the company and leadership values performance on an issue. Lack of measurement contributed to a culture that accepted non-compliance.
Supervisory Practices: Failure of this barrier created a lack of accountability that contributed to this event.
HFACs:
Motivation/Arousal. This factor refers to mental conditions that may negatively affect performance, including complacency. Related to this event, employees became complacent with not acting on FERC official letters due to competing work priorities.
Inadequate Design. This situational factor refers to confusing, cumbersome, inflexible, or incompatible tools or technology that individuals and teams use to perform their work. Related to this event, the work order module does not prioritize or risk-rank compliance work, and the assumption of priority was assumed to be a first-in, first-out model. Procedures were not established to monitor noncompliance or status of response to regulator correspondence.
Failure to Confirm Information. This personnel factor refers to a failure to ensure that information sent or received is understood. Related to this event, a FERC official letter was sent in July and September but wasn’t acted upon by the company until a third official letter was sent by FERC in November.
Inadequate Monitoring/Backup. This personnel factor refers to a failure to support team members or assist others in performing activities. Related to this event, Dam Safety and Licensing were both experiencing staffing shortages, high turnover, and leadership changes. Known duties were not adequately transferred when team members changed roles.
Failed to provide adequate guidance. This factor refers to communication of policies, procedures, or performance expectations. Related to this event, expectations on how to handle official letters from FERC were not communicated.
Failed to provide adequate oversight. This factor refers to monitoring of work activities and engagement with the workforce. Related to this event, the July and September official FERC letters were not monitored or prioritized.
Corporate Oversight. This factor refers to levels of leadership engagement and appreciation of risks related to operational process. Related to this event, leadership lacked a compliance engagement program that ensured leadership engagement and appreciation of risks.
Supporting Materials:
Corrective Actions:
Respond to November letter
Create a responsible/accountable person for formal letters and compliance work.
Establish governance that any compliance deviation (overdue, missing, erroneous or other problem) described in a formal letter is captured in the internal tracking system.
Develop and implement a procedure to provide guidance and expectations on responding to regulatory correspondence.
Establish clearly defined roles and responsibilities for interacting with the regulator to ensure compliance is met. Delineate guidance for escalating within the company if meeting the compliance due date is challenged.
Conduct Compliance Workshops with stakeholders to ensure understanding of requirements and expectations.
Sequence & Completion Dates for Actions Listed:
Actions-Missed-FERC-Notification Rev 1
Lessons Learned:
Recommendations: